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certified checks have been removed from the embrace of the problems in-
herent in stop payments orders, and henceforth will be governed by the law
of adverse claims.
TIMOTHY DALY
Securities—Issuance of "Put" and "Call" Options—Applicability of
Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.—Silverman
v. Landa.1—Plaintiff shareholder, relying on sections 16(b) and 16(c) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, commenced this action on behalf
of his corporation,2
 against Alfons Landa, a director of the Fruehauf
Trailer Company, to recover alleged insider short-swing profits. Landa had
simultaneously issued a put and a call option on Freuhauf common stock.
The call option was given for a premium, and entitled the optionee to buy
from Landa, at any time within the following year, 500 shares at a prede-
termined price. The put, similarly issued for a retained premium, provided
the bearer with the option of selling to Landa, at any time within the follow-
ing year, 500 shares at the same predetermined price. The call options were
allowed to lapse, whereas the put was subsequently exercised. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment and was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. HELD: The matched sale of put and call
options did not, in and of themselves, constitute a "purchase and sale" of
the underlying security within the purview of section 16(b), and there
having been no sale, section 16(c) could not have been violated.
Section 16(b) requires an "insider" 3
 to account to his corporation for
any trading profits made by him in any six month period from the purchase
and sale or sale and purchase of the issuer's stock or similar security. {
"Purchase" is elsewhere defined as including any "contract to buy, purchase
or otherwise acquire,"3 and "sale," as including any "contract to sell or
otherwise dispose of,"° the corporation's securities. Section 16(c), in essence,
prohibits "selling short" or, if the trader in fact owns the security, his
failure to deliver it within twenty days of the sale.'
The court, faced with the novel question of the applicability of these
statutory provisions to the issuance of a "straddle"s (i.e., the simultaneous
1 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962).
2
 The Securities and Exchange Act provides for a corporate cause of action, and
if said corporation fails to take advantage of it or prosecute it diligently within a given
period, any security owner can sue to recover on behalf of the corporation any profits
made by the trader. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958). See Lattin, The
Law of Corporations 277 (1959); Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities
and Exchange Act, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 385, 408 (1953).
3
 The statute specifically refers to any director, officer, or beneficial owner of more
than 10% of any class of equity security registered on a national securities exchange.
4
 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958).
5
 48 Stat. 882 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (13) (1958).
6
 48 Stat. 882 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (14) (1958).
7 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1958).
8 The context within which this decision was reached was clearly stated by the
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issuing of a put and a call), treated the transaction as an irrevocable offer
with no definable change in the beneficial ownership of the security. Thus,
it would follow, the court suggested, that as both options were not exer-
cised within the six month period, there could be no consummated bilateral
contract of purchase and sale or sale and purchase.
The nature of these options was apparently early defined, although in
a somewhat different context, in the case of White v. Treat,D wherein the
court concluded that there had been no contract of sale when the option
privilege was bought. Rather, when the optionee actually agreed to buy,
by conforming to the prescribed manner of acceptance, a new contract—
then first made—effected the sale. The decision in Falco v. Donner Founda-
tion Inc., 10
 expressly stated that the running of the six month liability
period in the act would commence only when the insider's rights and obliga-
tions became certain, and affirmed a position taken earlier, that the exercise
of an option would be a "purchase" within the scope of section 16(b). 11
While it would appear that these decisions are conclusive on the question,
it is essential to note that in these cases the insider is the optionee and not,
as here, the issuer of the options. Thus, plaintiff is in effect asserting a dual
standard of liability; namely, when the optionee is the insider, liability
affixes when the option is exercised—this in accord with contract law—but
when he is the writer of the option, the contract of purchase and sale is
said to occur on the issuance of the option.
Plaintiff is perhaps forced into a seemingly inconsistent position because
of a failure to more clearly distinguish the two methods of attack. If, on the
one hand, contract law is applied, the insider's position under the facts of
this case is one of an offeror who has received a consideration for his
promise not to revoke.i 2 However, the court concludes that this contract
is not the basic bilateral executory contract of purchase and sale referred
to in section 16(b), 73 an example of which would be the case wherein A and
B agree presently to transfer securities six months and one day later. If,
however, plaintiff's contention is that the court should not apply this strict
contract terminology, because in her view it prevents the effectuation of
the legislative intent and the spirit of the act—in short, that it would be
lower court: "No analogous case has been called to our attention and no regulation or
rule has ever been issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission covering the same
except its regulation requiring such transactions to be reported by insiders." Silverman
v. Landa, 200 F. Supp. 193, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
9 100 Fed. 290 (2d Cir. 1900). A call was held not to be "an agreement to sell" and
thus not subject to a stamp tax imposed by Section 25 of the War Revenue Act of 1898.
The court concluded that use of the phrase "agreement to sell" was intended as a syn-
onym for "sale" covering sales where payment and delivery are postponed to some future
date. It was a question of statutory interpretation, and it was determined that in that
context no tax was intended on agreements of sale which do not themselves effect or
secure some transfer of the stock or security.
10 208 F.2d 600 (2c1 Cir. 1953).
11 Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 332 U.S. 761 (1947);
Accord, Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1954).
12 Restatement, Contracts 46 (1932); 1 Williston, Contracts 61A (3d ed. 1959).
18 Cf. White v. Treat, supra note 9.
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preferable to apply two separate chronological standards of liability—it is
conceivable that her position would be more readily understood.
It is indeed clear that the historical and legislative background of
section 16(b) is one of an attempt to curb insider profit through speculation
and short-swing trading in the stock of his company by removing any possi-
bility of the retention of such profits." It can be suggested that this trans-
action can and does lend itself to this type of speculation, and that, as held
in the landmark case of Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.," judicial interpreta-
tion should attempt to "squeeze all possible profits out of stock transac-
tions, ... to establish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict between
the selfish interest of a fiduciary officer, director or stockholder, and the
faithful performance of his duty2 76 Thus, when viewed in the framework
of the legislative intent and the spirit of the act, these same considerations
which led the court in Blau v. Ogsbury' 7
 to determine that the date of the
exercise of the option is controlling in affixing liability when the insider
is the purchaser, may require that the date of issuance is controlling when
the insider is the optioner.
While it would appear that the court reached a technically defensible
result, it seems equally obvious that this type of speculation is contemplated
within the scope of the act. Conceivably, Landa could have suffered losses
if either the put or call was separately exercised; his apparent avenue of
profit Iay in the failure to exercise either so that the retained premiums
become profit. This in turn rested on the accuracy of his estimate that the
market price of Fruehauf stock would remain relatively fixed in the coming
year, for in the absence of rather significant fluctuations in price in one
direction or the other, the attractiveness of exercising a put or call would
be severely diminished." The court, no doubt cognizant of the myriad of
factors which affect the market performance of a security, was sceptical
concerning the possibility of an insider "predicting," as it were, such a
steady market course." However, the court is far from convincing when it
thus attempts to minimize the speculative opportunities available to the
insider who issues a straddle, 2° implying that such actions are not properly
within the purview of section I6(b). To be sure, future earnings and divi-
dends, present contracts, short term liabilities and assets not reported on
stockholder notices, and similar information to which Landa would, as a
director, have ready access, are not the sole or even major determinant of
market price. But, this phenomenon is equally operative in "predicting"
bull or bear markets as well the logical extension of this position would
be to declare for unregulated speculation and return us to the situation
existing before passage of the Securities and Exchange Act. Certainly the
14 Sen. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934). See, The Scope of "Purchase
and Sale" Under Section 16(h) of the Securities and Exchange Act. 59 Yale L.J. 510,
513 (1950).
15 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
16
 Id. at 239.
210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954).
18 See Leffler, The Stock Market 353 (1951).




very dangers recognized as existing when the insider is the optionee are
also present, although admittedly to a somewhat lesser degree, when he
chooses to speculate through the writing of these options.
More substantial profits and less risk are perhaps attainable if the
insider himself purchases and sells puts and calls, but he may well be
subject to the restrictions of section 16(b), 2t which in the light of this
decision, he avoids by the issuance of a straddle. In view of the present
opinion, the essential thing about the act of exercising the option would
seem to be not that the insider has committed himself and cannot withdraw,
but rather the mere state of bilateral contractual certainty. It is unfortunate
if, in reaching this result, the court was influenced by the contention that
Landa had no control over the exercise of the option, and that "far from
allowing an insider to indulge in the speculation proscribed by section
16(b), the issuance of a straddle places him in a strait-jacket." 22 Perhaps
liability should not be contingent on the exercise of the option when the
insider is the optionee and when, for speculative purposes, he has already
made, so to speak, his last move by binding himself to a unilateral contract.
In conclusion, given the strict adherence to contract terminology by the
court in interpreting the relevant provisions of the act, the Securities and
Exchange Commission should adopt remedial regulations under the power
given to it in section 9(b),23 whereby the Commission has the power to
adopt rules dealing with all aspects of the use of put and call options. As
of this date, however, the Commission has not seen fit to exercise this
power.24 In the long view however, further acceptance of this rigid inter-
pretation will not only severely hamper the effectiveness of the act, but
may relegate the Commission to the more unsatisfactory alternative of
retrospective response by administrative decree to each new and ingenious
speculative scheme.
NORMAN JACOBS
Trade Regulations—Robinson-Patman Act—Justification of a Dis-
count' Based upon a Reduced Brokerage.—Thomasville Chair Co. v.
FTC.'—The petitioner brought this action to set aside a cease and desist
order of the respondent, the Federal Trade Commission. The order was issued
to curb Thomasville's pricing schedule which granted a five per cent discount
21 Comment, Put and Call Options Under Section 16(b) of the Securities and Ex-
change Act, 69 Yale L.J. 868, 894 (1960). It is therein suggested that it is "unlikely"
that insider option writing will develop into a "widespread" problem. This is no doubt
true because the successful issuance of puts and calls requires rather extensive holdings
so as to allow the speculator to deal in averages and thus protect himself from any
miscalculation. Nevertheless, the relatively smaller profits available to the insider-writer
of the option, and even the infrequency of this manner of speculation, in no way requires
the result reached in the Landa case.
22 Brief for Appellee, p. 13.
23 48 Stat. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1958),
24 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. g 22,621 (1958).
1 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962).
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